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In this paper'we xamine a number of pitfalls that one encounters inthe economic alculus 
of the consequences of aging populations. The main pitfalls of viewing the demographic 
future lie in assumptions concerning (1) the (ultimate) stationarity of population growth 
and the assumptions underlying those of the "theory" of demographic transition, (2) the 
exogeneity of factor prices and the state of technology, (3) the neglect of implicit delayed- 
payment contracts within firms in which younger workers implicitly pay for the wages of 
older workers, and (4) the time inconsistency o f intergenerational tr nsfer schemes ingeneral. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the emergence of aging economies, economists, sociolo- 
gists, and demographers are becoming concerned with the sus- 
tainability of the welfare s tate-a  welfare state that has been ex- 
panding ever since the Second World War. The expansion seems to 
have been stopped in its growth by the policymakers of a supply-side 
persuasion in the 1980s. The general feeling is that the welfare state 
has reached its limits, and with a view to the aging of populations, 
it is felt that drastic reforms are needed. A number of studies have 
appeared that have tried to assess the future of the welfare state 
in an aging society. ~ As with all scientific work, the authors of these 
~See, e.g., Heller, Hemming, and Kohnert (1986), Halter and Hemming (1987), OECD 
(1988), Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989), Auerbach et al. (1989), Masson and Tryon (1990), 
and Cutler et al. (1990). 
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studies had to use Occam's razor to make a distinction between 
important and unimportant elements of aging. However, leaving 
out unimportant aspects of a problem is a personal choice that 
may be open to debate, especially when the omission of an element 
changes policy conclusions radically. 
In order to weed out the important missing elements in a number 
of studies, I have summed up the most important pitfalls that one 
may encounter in the economic analysis of aging economies. In 
the process of modeling aging economies, one tends to abstract 
from this phenomenon i an inadequate manner. As with all of 
such shortcomings, one can learn two lessons from them. The first 
lesson amounts, of course, to the warning to be cautious in formu- 
lating policy implications too hastily. One should qualify one's 
conclusions by paying attention to the pitfall in question. The sec- 
ond lesson is perhaps more challenging, namely, one starts incorpo- 
rating the missing element in economic theory. This second lesson 
applies only to some of the listed pitfalls because the other short- 
comings are true pitfalls: They refer to the unsound application 
of economic theory to otherwise sound practical policy problems. 
For those cases, one should develop the art of economics-an art 
that both requires knowledge of institutions and of social, political, 
and historical phenomena and requires the ability to use available 
data in a reasonable way in discussing real-world economic issues 
(compare Colander, 1992). 
The first pitfall that we will deal with concerns the alleged con- 
stancy of population growth and the stability of age structures in 
the long run. It is a well-established convention in these studies 
to assume that economies return to some steady-state population 
growth rate. Demographic stability is refuted by demographic his- 
tory. Key demographic variables, such as the retirement age, life 
expectancy, and the fertility and mortality rates, are uncertain vari- 
ables and to some extent endogenous. The appropriate response 
would be to recognize the non-stationary character of demography 
and to view demographic and economic variables imultaneously. 
The second pitfall is related to the exogeneity of the state of 
technology and the relative factor prices of capital, labor, and natu- 
ral resources. Introducing exogenous and constant prices is in most 
cases a matter of convenience and technical simplicity. Developing 
a model of price formation is bound to make dynamic general 
equilibrium models intractable, but for policy evaluation endoge- 
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nous prices and technology 2 are of prime importance to assess the 
welfare implications of aging populations. Furthermore, relative 
factor prices are, more than demographic variables, prone to uncer- 
tainty. 
Pitfall number three concerns the inherent ime inconsistency 
tied to the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system of financing social secu- 
rity and, in some cases, private pension plans (namely, "final pay" 
arrangements). Sustainability of PAYG schemes is not credible 
because it introduces a conflict between the government in charge 
of the social security system and the individual citizens having to 
pay for this system. This section, in short, treats the political side 
of aging populations, although we are aware that the politics of 
aging are more far-re'aching. The pitfall many economists or poli- 
cymakers are likely to overlook is that one analyzes future social 
security systems as if the government is committed to some designed 
tax-transfer program for a specific planning horizon. As will be 
shown, a social security system is inherently time-inconsistent, in-
ducing a government to renege its original plans at some point in 
time, arising mainly from an externality in decision making, an 
externality that is lost under conditions of decentralization a d the 
absence of a commitment technology (like a law). 
The fourth and last pitfall is the much-neglected intergenera- 
tional transfer scheme that is used inside organizations. As empiri- 
cal evidence presented by Eggink, Hop, and van Praag (1993) and 
Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992) shows, young workers implicitly sub- 
sidize older workers by receiving a wage income below their mar- 
ginal productivity, and older workers receive an income well in 
excess of their marginal productivity. The pitfall one falls into in 
forecasting future real wage rates is to base those rates on the 
contemporaneous marginal productivity of labor instead of recog- 
nizing the age-related ivergence between productivity and pay- 
ment. Neglect of the implicit pay-as-you-go scheme inside firms 
may make the future of firms in an aging society seem overly opti- 
mistic and forecasts of wage rates (and subsequent pension liabili- 
ties) erroneous. 
The chronology of this paper is in accordance with the above- 
mentioned list of pitfalls. In Section 6, I will summarize the main 
conclusions and discuss some additional aspects of aging that fall 
outside the scope of this paper but are nonetheless relevant for the 
economic policy analysis of aging. 
2See Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1990). 
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2. P ITFALL I: DEMOGRAPHIC STABILITY 
AND CONSTANCY 
The mechanism that drives many models of aging is the general 
dependency ratio of retired or inactive population to that of the 
active or working population. There is much confusion about 
whether aging has a positive or negative impact on economic wel- 
fare. The confusion arises to some extent because conomists use 
different welfare functions or different welfare parameters toevalu- 
ate economic outcomes, but the main root of confusion is to be 
found in the object of study: Some economists focus on the conse- 
quences for government policy and others on the consequences for 
the private sector. Because the government finances the bulk of its 
output and transfers in an unfunded manner, the government will 
be heavily influenced by the change in population structure. An 
aging population implies in general a higher per capita tax burden, 
not only because of the changing ratio of active and inactive citi- 
zens, but also because the claim on public goods and services in- 
creases with age. 
For the private sector the consequences are less clear-cut, al- 
though the general feeling is that an aging of the population and 
a slowdown of the population growth rate are beneficial to intergen- 
erational welfare (see Cutler et al., 1990). In this section, I first 
want to review some of the demographic assumptions that are im- 
plicitly or explicitly used in forecasting the economic onsequences 
of aging. The analysis will be partial for expository reasons. Second, 
I will pay attention to the pitfalls that one encounters in viewing 
the dynamics of aging. False pictures about the length and speed 
of aging may be drawn if one does not pay attention to private 
decision making on fertility, schooling, retirement, and health in- 
vestments. 
A central tenet in studying aging economies i  that the population 
growth rate eventually settles down to a constant and stable growth 
rate. This is to a large extent a fallacious reflection of reality because 
population growth has a natural tendency to fluctuate, whether this 
arises from structural uncertainty or from intentional household 
decision making. The stochastic behavior of demography is perhaps 
best illustrated by examining the two main underlying forces behind 
the population growth rate over time: the crude birth rate (CBR) 
and the crude death rate (CDR), per 1000 persons. Figures la and 
1 d show the development of both variables over time for the popula- 
tion of England and Wales and for that of the Netherlands, respec- 
tively. As one can see, the CBR and the CDR seem to move in 
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Figure l(a) CDR and CBR, England and Wales, 1727-1990. (b) Fertility uncer- 
tainty, England and Wales. (c) Mortality uncertainty, England and Wales. (d) 
CBR and CDR, the Netherlands, 1805-1990. (e) Fertility uncertainty, the Nether- 
lands. (/) Mortality uncertainty, the Netherlands. 
line. However, both variables have slightly different time-series 
properties. For example, the uncertainty surrounding mortality and 
fertility diverge, especially in the last 20 years 3 (see Figures lb 
3The Figures lb, lc, le, and If are constructed by estimating an ARMA(1,1) process 
for the CDR and the CBR. The uncertainty inboth graphs is in fact the residual of fitted 
and actual time series. 
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Table 1A:: Unit  Root Tests for Mortal i ty and Fertil ity 
ADF-t statistic 
ADF-t statistic with constant and 
Series and country Time span Lag length' with constant b trend term b 
Crude birth rate 1727-1920 5 0.120 0.752 
Eng land  and Wales 1920-1990 4 - 1.685 -2 .161  
1727-1990 6 0.200 - 1.594 
The Netherlands 1803-1946 4 - 1.201 -2 .740  
1946-1990 3 - 0.927 - 3.850"* 
1803-1990 5 0.281 - 3.180" 
Crude death rate 1727-1920 5 - 1.403 -4 .351"*  
England and Wales 1920-1990 4 - 5.436*** - 6.039*** 
1727-1990 6 - 1.182 - 3.421" 
The Netherlands 1803-1946 4 -0 .850  -2 .593  
1946-1990 3 - 14.924"** - 24.440*** 
1803~1990 5 - 1.126 - 2.016 
a The  lag length is roughly equal to the third root of the sample size (see Said and Dickey, 
1984. 
b Augmented Dickey-Fulller test statistics. 
* Statistically significant at 0.10 level,  based on MacKinnon critical t-values. 
** Statistically significant at 0.05 level.  
*** Statistically significant at 0.01 level.  
through 1 f). The predictability of the CDR has increased in the 
last 20 years, whereas the predictability of the CBR remains unal- 
tered. This is, however, a superficial deduction about the time-series 
properties of these two variables. 
If one wants to be more confident about the future be of demo- 
graphic variables, one should have a firm grasp of demographic 
history and examine statistically whether fertility and mortality are 
stationary for subsamples of history. We can test the stationarity 
of fertility and mortality time series more formally by means of 
unit root tests? Table 1 shows the stationarity tests that reveal 
whether the CDR and the CBR are stationary. Unit root tests show 
that the CBR cannot be described as a stationary variable over 
time. Only for the case of the CDR for the subsample 1920-90 for 
England and Wales can one safely say that it is stationary. The 
4For  an introduction on unit roots and cointegration, see Stewart (1991). 
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augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistics are statistically significant at 
1-percent level. To check whether the English demographic history 
is an exceptional case, I have run the same tests on Dutch data for 
the sample period 1803-1990. The conclusions are similar to those 
for England and Wales. Only for the subsample 1946-90 can one 
detect stationarity in the CDR at the 1-percent significance l vel. 
In the theory of demographic transition both the death rate and 
the birth rate are supposed to be interrelated. The postulated change 
is from near equality of birth and death rates at high levels in a 
traditional society to near equality at low levels in a highly modern- 
ized society (Coale, 1989). A priori one would expect hat in the 
modern-day societies the interdependency between fertility and 
mortality is no longer valid because the need for having children 
seems to have diminished with the advance of the modern welfare 
state. The old-age-security h pothesis of children functioning as a 
capital good in old age seems to have ended in the first half of 
the twentieth century, an era that is marked by the emergence of
government-provided social security. Another feature of demo- 
graphic transition isthat the decline in mortality normally preceded 
the decline in fertility. We can test the propositions of demographic 
transition more formally by employing the Engle-Granger cointe- 
gration tests. 
Table 2 shows for the English and Welsh population that from 
1727 to 1990 the relationship between the birth rate and the death 
rate is not valid at standard significance l vels. Lagging the mortal- 
ity rate by 10 years (and longer time lags, such as 25 years) does 
not change this conclusion. For the Netherlands this relationship 
only seems to exist prior to the Second World War, but only at 
the 5-percent significance l vel. The non-existence or weak existence 
of the relationship between fertility and mortality makes it all the 
more important to view both elements more carefully in predicting 
future demographic developments. 
Summing up, using a constant or stationary demographic state 
as a point of departure for analyzing aging economies i a pitfall 
if we look at the statistical properties of demographic history. How- 
ever, economists are merely human, and using an unrealistic prem- 
ise is not that serious if the economic content of aging surpasses the 
demographic content of aging in terms of importance. However, if 
we stick to the assumption that the fluctuations in population 
growth rate will peter out and become constant at some point in 
time, we are still left with another pitfall, namely the endogeneity 
of demography. The main determinants driving the dependency 
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Table 2: Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests Between Mortal ity and Fertility 
ADFb-statistic with ADF'-statistic with 
lag mortalityd: lag mortalityd: 
Time Lag 
Country span length" 0 10 0 10 
England and Wales 1727-1920 5 - 1 .839  - 1 .859  - 1 .623  - 1 .735  
1920-1990 4 -2 .181  -2 .701  -2 .909  -2 .668  
1727-1990 6 - 2 .240  - 2 .665  - 1 .860  - 2 .459  
The Netherlands 1803-1946 4 - 3 .374**  - 3 .590**  - 3 .587"  - 3 .386  
1946-1990 3 - 1 .982  - 1 .215  - 1 .534  - 1 .278  
1803-1990 5 -2 .159  -2 .466  -2 .086  -2 .444  
a The lag length is roughly equal to the third root of the sample size (see Said andDickey, 
1984.  
b Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics for cointegration test with a constant term. 
c Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics for cointegration test with a constant and a 
trend term. 
d The mortality rate is lagged in order to test for the hypothesis that a fertility decline 
follows a mortality decline with some time lag. A time lag of, e .g . ,  25  years did not change 
our conclusions. 
* Statistically significant at 0.10  level based on MacKinnon critical t-values. 
**  Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
ratios are demographic and economic parameters uch as the retire- 
ment age, the average life expectancy, the number of years of formal 
schooling, and the birth rate. With respect o each of these variables 
applied economists and demographers alike treat them as natural 
constants, whereas each and every one of these variables are subject 
to choice, whether directly or, in the case of life expectancy and 
the birth rate, indirectly. The date of retirement from the labor 
force is a choice variable (see OECD, 1992, and Henkens and 
Siegers, 1991), and given the fact that individuals have different 
life expectancies and working careers, they are inclined to choose 
different dates of retirement. As it turns out, low-income individu- 
als have on average a lower life expectancy than high-income indi- 
viduals, a fact that is to a large extent caused by different life-styles 
and diverging health investments. The different planning horizons 
that are a result of these factors naturally induce one to take differ- 
ent retirement decisions (see Lazear, 1986). Low-income individuals 
retire on average earlier than high-income individuals. Further- 
more, the individual reactions are reinforced by the economic (dis)- 
incentives that arise on account of the intergenerational public 
transfer schemes that are applicable in most OECD countries. The 
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PAYG schemes formalized in public pension systems do not stimu- 
late savings and work effort. The reason why is quite simple: Under 
conditions of dynamic efficiency, a PAYG schedule implies a de- 
crease in lifetime income. To rephrase this: The average consumer 
pays more in taxes than he will receive in benefits. Of course this 
applies to a homogenous population. If there are income differences 
across individuals, this may cause different incentives to save and 
work across income groups. 
Because of these intragenerational and intergenerational trans- 
fers, it is of importance to observe the various dependency ratios. 
The two most-cited ependency ratios relate the population of old- 
aged and the general dependent population (old aged and children) 
to the potential work force. To see this more clearly we can write 
these two ratios down explicitly. The total population, N(t), at time 
t), can be split up into three different age categories: the children 
and adolescents (Nc), the potential work force (Nw) and the old 
and retired (NR). In order to write down the size of the total popula- 
tion and its subparts, we have to know the average life expectancy 
(79, the age at which one starts working (H), the retirement age 
(R), and the population growth rate (n). The population isassumed 
to be stable, growing exponentially at the rate n. Births per unit 
of time, B(t), are given by: B(t) = B(O)e ~'. If we normalize the 
initial birth cohort, B(O), to 1 we can write down the different 
populations: 
j t 1 - e -nr  Nt  = Net  + Nwt  + NRt = t -  re  ~s ds  = - -  e ~t 
r l  
where: 
(1) 
it 1 - e -~n 
Nct= t_ne~ ds  = ~ e  ~t (2) 
n 
t -H  
Nw,  = It-R e'~ ds  = e -~n e-nR e ~t (3) 
n 
Jt 
-R  e -nR  - e -nT  
NRt = t -  r e~ ds  = e ~r (4) 
n 
In the day-to-day practice of the policymaker, the simple depen- 
dency ratio of the old to potential work force (11 = NldNw) is often 
used. Because the majority of public pension programs are financed 
on a PAYG basis, one can also interpret 11 as the lump sum tax 
the work force has to pay to the retired population. 
If one wants more general dependency ratios, one should also 
include the other population group that depends on the income 
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Tab le  3: Stable Popu la t ion  DependencY Rat ios  
t9 
Benchmarka 16.5% 61.3 % 
H= 18 17.4% 70.0%o 
H=20 18.3% 79.4% 
R=67 12.9% 56.4% 
R = 63 20.3% 66.6% 
T=78 19.3% 64.1% 
T= 80 22.0% 66.8% 
n = 0% 22.4% 55.1% 
n = - 1% 30 .0% 53 .4% 
a Calculations based on the parameters: H= 16, R=65,  T=76,  n= 1%o. 
from the adults, namely the children and adolescents, giving the 
following ratio: to = (NR + Nc) /Nw.  Writing these ratios down: 
e-nR _ e -nT  
q e -"H-e ,4 (5) 
(e  - "R - e - " r  + 1 - e - "~ 
tO = (e_ . i4  _ e_ .R  ) (6) 
Table 3 gives some numerical examples of dependency ratios for 
stable population structures. As one can deduce from Table 3, a 
decrease in the birth rate has a large effect on the simple dependency 
ratio, vl. The general dependency ratio (tO) behaves in more or less 
the same direction, with exception of the effect of a population 
decline: Population decline alleviates the work force to some extent, 
whereas in the case of the simple dependency ratio, a population 
decline increases the burden on the work force. 
These stable dependency ratios provide us with some background 
to evaluate the historical development of dependency ratios for the 
U.K. population for the period 1900-90. The steady increase in 
old-age dependency ratio (11) for the United Kingdom as shown in 
Figure 2 is to some extent explained by a fertility decline. However, 
the increase in 11 cannot be caused by a fertility decline only; the 
increase in longevity is also a plausible aging factor. 
Increased longevity has two effects on the demography of a coun- 
try that need to be distinguished, namely (1) a fall in the mortality 
rate, d, will lead to an increase in the aggregate population growth 
rate, and (2) because mortality is not evenly distributed over the 
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Figure 2. Dependency ratios, U.K., 1990-1990. 
_ _  Simple dependency ratio . . . .  General dependency ratio 
different age groups, a fall in mortality will lead to an increase in 
the number of retired and old aged. As Figure 3 shows, the im- 
proved living conditions in England and Wales have led to a consid- 
erable fall in the infant mortality rate and old-age mortality rate. 
The role of infant mortality is nowadays negligible, thereby giving 
more importance to the role of old-age mortality. 
So far we have only discussed stable populations, which in the 
demographic sense of the term means that the age-specific rate of 
fertility and mortality and its (normalized) age distribution are all 
constant over time. From an economic and demographic point 
of view, it would be desirable to talk about the consequences of 
non-stable populations. Only a few economists 5 have looked at the 
questions of non-stationary population growth, perhaps because 
the dynamics of non-stationary population growth are far less 
transparent than its stationary counterpart. In the remainder of 
this section I will elaborate on the economic onsequences of a 
250 
200 
x:  100 
Figure 3. Mortality rate per age-group, 1840 vs. 1980. 
[] death rate, males, 1840 [] death rate, males, 1980 
~See Merton (1975) and Van Imhoff (1989). 
168 H .P .  van  Dalen 
population decline, 6 as caused by a drop in fertility (b), and in- 
creased longevity, as caused by a drop in the mortality rate (d), 
and discuss the various pitfalls that lie in wait behind these changes. 
The effect of migration is left out of the analysis because of the 
plethora of assumptions that accompany this part of demography. 7 
To keep things simple I will restrict attention to a population 
that consists of workers and retirees. Suppose that the population 
grows steadily until time to. Assume furthermore that this switching 
point lies far into the future (i.e., to > 7) so that a steady-state 
population distribution has been achieved at time to. After to the 
population growth rate drops to n' < n and remains there perma- 
nently. The population growth decline is caused by a drop in fertil- 
ity: n' = b' - d and n = b - d, where b' < b. Under these assump- 
tions the number of people born at time t will be: 
(Noe nt for t _< to 
Nt = ( Ntoee(t_ to) = NoemOen'{t-to) for t > to (7) 
To analyze the implications of a population decline, one can 
make the analysis more transparent by dividing the transition pe- 
riod into three intervals. These three intervals mark the manner in 
which the relatively large cohorts affect the population pyramid. 
At first one will encounter an aging labor force, then one will experi- 
ence a boom in retirement, and in a third phase one will return to 
a new steady state that is marked by an older population structure. 
2A. The Interval t e (to, to + R): The Aging Labor Force 
During this interval the population decline has affected the work- 
ing population between ages 0 and R but not the retired population. 
This phase of the population decline seems to apply quite well for 
the industrialized economies. It is expected that until 2010 those 
economies will experience an aging labor force. The year 2010 
marks the time at which the baby boom generation of 1945 retires 
from the labor force. For the dependency ratio in this interval we 
can write: 
6The analysis of population increase can be found in Boadway and Wildasin (1989). 
Their analysis contains, however, a number of errors; therefore I will elaborate and correct 
their analysis. 
7 International migration involves a number of assumptions that lie somewhat outside 
the scope of this paper. See van Dalen (1993) for some of the issues of  international migration. 
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11, = ,o (8) 
tt_R e~ ds + I'oe~'oe"~-to' ds 
or  
e~t (e-,,R _ e-~r) 
Tit = (9) 
e~'0- e"~'-~)÷ e~n-"~'~e *  - e~"o) (~;) 
In order to see how the dependency ratio changes over time, we 
need to derive the growth rate of the dependency ratio. If we denote 
the denominator of Equations 8 and 9 as D, and we differentiate 
the dependency ratio with respect to time, we obtain the following 
differential equation: 
flt = rlt (n - n') ( ~ ) e't° { ee(t - t°) " 1]>0 (10) 
As our intuition would suggest, a decline in the population 
growth rate would result in an increase in the dependency ratio at 
first. The speed with which the increase in the dependency ratio 
accelerates can also be determined if we differentiate Equation 10 
again with respect o time: 
 oI l+..t .. .l.. 
llt(n - n3ne~t°e ~"-'°) + 
D 
where D > O. For a wide range of parameter settings, the speed 
with which the dependency ratio increases will at first be positive. 
Hence, the phenomenon of an aging labor force will become more 
apparent by the day. 
2B. The Interval t ~ (to + R,  to + T): The Pension Boom 
Now in this interval the population decline will affect he number 
of retired, and as we mentioned in the previous ection, this process 
will start around 2010. The dependency ratio will still increase, but 
once the smaller generations begin to retire, the speed with which 
the dependency ratio increases will fall. To see this, write down 
the dependency ratio for this interval: 
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ItO f t-R e ~s ds  + e~toe,'ts- toJ ds  
t- T to 
= ~ (12) ~t 
t e~toe ' ts-t°) ds  
J t-R 
or ,  
(~)  [ ent° -  en~t-r~]+etn-n ' , to  [en ' t t -~ ,_  eet0] 
tit = (13) et.-,,')to [~,t _ e.'t,-R~] 
The following differential equation describing the evolution of 
the dependency ratio over time is: 
~lt = n' (n'  - n ) (e  "~t-~ - e ~t°) >0 (14) 
Dn"  
The change in the increase in the dependency ratio becomes nega- 
tive as the smaller generations also retire, thereby alleviating the 
pressure on the labor force: 
i~, = (n'(n' -D) '" -  r)) - ~'--~-ff < O (15) 
where: b = n'e ~n-n~to [e~'`  - e ~'tt-R~] > O. 
The turning point in the speed of aging lies, therefore, at time 
R, the age of retirement. When this phase of the pension boom 
will end is, of course, hard to determine because the populations 
of industrialized countries are not affected by once-and-for-all 
birth-rate declines but by a gradual process of decline. Further- 
more, the increase in life expectancy lengthens the transition period. 
Given the demographic trends in industrialized countries, one 
would expect his process to end between 2025 and 2050. 
2C. The Interval t ~ (to + T, c~): The New Steady State 
This last interval marks again a steady state. The dependency 
ratio is again stable, but it is permanently higher because the new 
(stable) population structure at the lower population growth rate, 
n', has aged. 
In conclusion, the analysis of non-stable populations i to a cer- 
tain extent straightforward. A population decline leads to an ever- 
increasing dependency ratio, where the length of the transition is 
determined by the life expectancy (T), the speed of aging is deter- 
mined by the initial and long-run population growth rate (n and 
n'), the age of retirement, and death (R and T, respectively). 
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The previous calculations showed the bare bones of aging popula- 
tions and some of the pitfalls one may be tempted to overlook. 
Summing up, key demographic variables like fertility and mortality 
are not interrelated as the theory of demographic transition sug- 
gests. Furthermore, they cannot be considered stationary (although 
the mortality time series seem to be stationary for the Dutch and 
U.K. economies for the post-Second World War period). Besides 
the non-stationary character of demographic development, there 
are mechanisms that speed up or slow down the transition from 
one state to another. For instance, lifetime expansion lengthens 
the period of transition. Early retirement does not affect the total 
transition period, but it does lengthen the period in which an econ- 
omy has to deal with the increase in pensioners. The pitfalls one 
encounters in applied policy studies of aging is the failure to recog- 
nize the endogeneity s and non-stationarity of the demographic state 
of a country. 
There is, however, more to aging than demographic accounting. 
In dealing with the economic ontent of aging, one would like 
to know the economic burden of aging and not the demographic 
burden. In other words, one would like to know the development 
over time of the tax and benefit bases. A more general dependency 
ratio should take account of the income of the overlapping genera- 
tions and the benefit levels that are generally indexed to current 
wage developments. Such a task implicitly demands knowledge of 
the development of future prices and the state of technology. In 
the next section we will turn to this issue. 
3. PITFALL II: EXOGENOUS FACTOR PRICES 
AND TECHNOLOGY 
So far the discussion has been purely demographic and not eco- 
nomic. Both are intimately related because the age structure of a 
population influences whether anation as a whole saves or dissaves, 
whether one works or enjoys the leisure of retirement. The majority 
of studies of aging employing a partial equilibrium approach of 
constant factor prices and the state of technology generally give 
s Someone who does recognize this relationship is the population economist Easterlin, 
who bases his theory and empirics of long-term cycles in fertility on individual decision 
making. His views therefore contrast strongly those of the mainstream population forecasters 
of national statistical offices. As he stated recently, "Both theory and history suggest as a 
serious possibility a prospective upswing in fertility" (Easterlin, 1992); 
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an impression of the demographic mpact of aging. However, the 
feedback on factor price formation is usually left out for reasons 
of intractability. As mentioned earlier, this is unfortunate, and in 
some cases it might give a false impression of the economic impact 
of aging. To some extent this state of affairs is understandable 
because the economic theory of endogenous technical progress is 
well-developed but the empirical underpinning of this theory is 
sadly lacking. 
Despite the lack of empirical content on the theory of endogenous 
technology, one can still go through with the analysis and illustrate 
how important the interaction between aging and changing factor 
prices is. A simple theory that gives an insight into the economic 
consequences of a change in the rate of population growth is the 
life-cycle model of consumption and saving of households as devel- 
oped by Arthur and McNicoll (1977, 1978). They take consumption 
and labor supply profiles as given and simply look how the age 
structure influences intergenerational welfare. The fundamental in- 
sight that Arthur and McNicoll offers is that an increase in the 
population growth rate need not be detrimental to average individ- 
ual welfare. If the average age of consumption is higher than the 
average age of the labor force, consumers will enjoy the benefits of 
an implicit intergenerational transfer when the population growth 
increases. This is more or less the chain-letter or Ponzi-game argu- 
ment: As long as there are new generations to service a debt, one 
can increase current welfare (see Weil, 1989). The intergenerational 
transfer effect of a population increase xceeds the capital dilution 
effect of population growth. 
Of course, the reverse applies to the case of a population decline. 
Traditional neoclassical growth theory, as initiated by Robert So- 
low (1956), traces the negative ffects of a population increase, 
because such an increase has to be accompanied by a proportional 
investment. Population growth dilutes the existing capital stock, 
and it is in this fashion that population growth is marked a "bad," 
and to this the science of economics owes its title "dismal science." 
The analysis of Arthur and McNicoll can, of course, be further 
disaggregated to take account of the household composition and 
the consumption pattern of the various household members. Analy- 
sis of this type has been done by Lee and Lapkoff (1988) and Ermisch 
(1989). Ermisch has found that the average age of consumption i
Great Britain and Japan exceeds the average age of the labor force. 
Assuming no productivity growth over generations, the average 
ages of household consumption and the labor force in Great Britain 
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are 46.3 and 41.3, respectively. If we assume a 2-percent rate of 
productivity, the average ages of consumption and production are 
41.7 and 38.7, respectively. The average ages of consumption and 
production in Japan are higher than those of Great Britain. For 
instance, with a 2-percent productivity growth rate, the average 
age of consumption is 45.1, and average age of production is 41.0. 
These findings are in general agreement with those of Lee and Lap- 
koff (1988) for the United States. The general conclusion is that 
net transfers between households go from younger to older genera- 
tions. This intergenerational transfer effect may, however, be 
dampened, if not outweighted, by the capital dilution effect. Some 
general calculations by Ermisch (1989) show that the capital dilu- 
tion effect may indeed be stronger than the intergenerational trans- 
fer effect. 
In a related but different manner, one can look at the issue of 
exogeneity of factor prices by looking at the historical development 
of real factor prices. In a small but influential paper, Henry Aaron 
(1966) showed the conditions under which a PAYG scheme implies a 
Pareto improvement for the generations concerned. The alternative 
method of financing social security is the capital reserve (CR) or 
fully funded system. The exact condition is in fact a (stationary) 
dynamic efficiency condition, namely r > n + g; that is, the economy 
is characterized byunderinvestment. Under this condition o gener- 
ation can improve its welfare by investing in the PAYG-financed 
social security system without harming the welfare position of an- 
other generation. The intuition behind the Aaron result is straight- 
forward: Both systems, CR and PAYG, are assets with their own 
rate of return. The rate of return of the CR system is the expected 
real interest rate, and the rate of return of the PAYG system is 
the sum of the population growth rate and, if the benefit levels are 
indexed to real wage growth, the real wage growth rate. Under 
conditions of uncertainty with respect to the inflation rate, interest 
rates, and nominal wages, one has to look at how these key variables 
will develop over time. The transversality condition on government 
debt requires a zero limit of discounted future government debt 
(see Bohn, 1991). Analysis of historical development might provide 
some hints about how large the differences between the key rates 
of returns are. Figure 4 shows the development of the ex  ante  real 
interest rate together with the population growth rate for the U.K. 
economy over the period 1728-1990. The expected real interest rate 
174 H .P .  van  Dalen 
10 
5 
~o 
-5  
-10 
1760 1800 1840 1880 1920 1960 
Figure 4. Expected real interest rate and  popu la t ion  growth.  
_ _  Expected real interest rate . . . .  Popu la t ion  growth  rate 
is defined as the nominal interest rate minus the expected inflation 
ra te .  9 
The irony of this figure is that ever since the Beveridge welfare 
state was introduced after the Second World War the population 
growth rate has never exceeded the real interest rate. However, a 
more more just picture would be to illustrate the divergence b tween 
the expected real interest rate on the one hand and the sum of the 
expected real wage rate and population growth rate on the other 
hand. This is in fact the Aaron condition. Figure 5 shows this 
condition for the period 1803-1990 together with the line expressing 
equality of the two rates of return, namely the interest rate on the 
one hand and the real wage growth rate and population growth 
rate on the other hand. As one can see, an unambiguous choice 
is no longer possible on the basis of these parameters. If one wants 
to decide on the method of finance, one has to take account of the 
uncertainty surrounding the key determinants of the capital reserve 
and the PAYG system. 
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Figure 5. Aaron  cond i t ion  (r - n - g), 1800-1990. 
9The expected inflation rate is modeled as an ARMA(1,1) process. 
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Finally, we have to pay attention that a pitfall that lies at the heart 
of economic theory, namely the assumption ofperfect competition. 
Mainstream macroeconomists assume that markets are complete 
and that the individual agents act in perfect competition with each 
other. Because agents act atomistically, they take prices as given. 
They can only influence prices in an indirect manner, namely 
through aggregate market ransactions. If one discards this simpli- 
fying assumption and replaces it by monopolistic behavior, one 
might come closer to a more realistic model of the economy, namely 
one in which the market power of pension funds is a real issue, 
like in some industrialized countries (the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands). With respect to aging economies, the issue is relevant 
because private pensiofi funds and insurance companies are gather- 
ing clout on the capital market where they have become the domi- 
nant supplier of capital. As shown in van Dalen and van Praag 
(1993), monopolistic behavior of pension funds is detrimental to 
consumer welfare because pension funds drive up the real interest 
rate and consequently lower real wages by acting strategically on 
the capital market. The danger of dominant pension funds is an 
issue easily overlooked, but it will gain weight as the rate of savings, 
contractural nd voluntary, increases. 
4. P ITFALL III: TIME INCONSISTENT PAYG SCHEMES 
A point that is often neglected in the formulation of economic 
policy is the question whether optimal plans made today are still 
optimal tomorrow. Ever since the seminal paper by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) on the time inconsistency of optimal plans, it has 
become apparent that one has to be more careful in formulating 
economic policy. One can fall easily prone to the temptations of 
reneging on optimal policies announced yesterday. Social security 
is a case in point because it appears optimal from the point of view 
of the current constituency but as time passes one may find that 
a majority is in favor of defaulting on social security obligations. 
In short, the time-inconsistency argument of economic policy is 
simply an argument that tells you, "Beware of presidents hat utter: 
Read my lips, No New Taxes!" A policy that is proposed at the 
beginning of an administration may look optimal with the perspec- 
tive of someone who is looking at issues from time t. But one period 
later, the economy will have changed on account of reactions of 
consumers and producers to the proposed policy. However, a gov- 
ernment hat starts to recalculate policy as from time t + 1 on, 
will be tempted to change its policy and start o tax economic behav- 
ior that ex ante was variable and ex post is fixed. In other words, 
a government suddenly becomes aware of a tax base that will make 
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the welfare loss of taxation smaller. The time-inconsistency prob- 
lem that lies behind the modern-day welfare state can best be dis- 
cussed in general terms (compare Chari, Kehoe, and Prescott, 1989) 
and compare the two systems under conditions of commitment and 
the absence of commitment. 
The basic difference between capital reserve (CR) and PAYG is 
that the first system is intragenerationally and intergenerationally 
neutral, whereas the second system is by definition not so. The 
intention of  PAYG is to redistribute national income among heter- 
ogenous agents. The government that intends to deal with social 
security matters by means of the finance method PAYG implicitly 
defines its policy in terms of aggregate average allocations instead 
of the sum of individual allocations. To show the divergence in 
policy outcomes, we define the objective function of individual 
agents as: 
Ul(x, ~) = U(xi, ~x, "¢) (16) 
n 
where ~ = ~i=1 ( l /n)x i  denotes the aggregate per capita alloca- 
tions, and fl is a parameter that defines the mixture of  PAYG and 
CR. Under complete PAYG coverage 13 = 1, and under full CR 
coverage 13 = 0. For 0 < I] -< 1, the individual agent i indirectly 
takes account of the allocations of other agents. By assumption, 
agents take decisions in a competitive manner, and therefore the 
aggregate allocation, ~, and the policy x, are taken as given. Under 
conditions of  commitment, the government chooses apolicy x, and 
then given this policy rule, private agents simultaneously choose 
their actions, x. Each agent i, faced with policy x and taking as 
given the actions of all other agents, x_~ = (Xl . . . . .  x~_ 1, x~ + 1, 
. . . .  , xn) maximizes Equation 16 with respect to x/, yielding the interior 
first-order condition: 
OU 
= 0 for all i (17) 
axi 
Assume that for each x there is a unique equilibrium x and the 
resulting outcome function X(x) is differentiable. The objective 
function of the government in charge of the social security system 
is: 
S(x, x) = ~ U~[(1 -13)x~, 13~, x] (18) 
i=1  
The policy rule, T, used by the government under conditions of a 
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complete PAYG system is restricted to depend only on the aggregate 
allocation, ~. The first-order conditions for the government design- 
ing a social security system are for 0 _ 13 _ 1: 
n ot ox  ot oF 
)-~,i=1 (1 - ~) - -  + + = 0 (19) 
Oxi Ox OF Ox 
Definition 1: A Commitment Equilibrium 
An equilibrium with commitment is a policy x* and an outcome 
function X(.) that satisfy: 
(1) Maximization for society. Given X(.), the policy x* solves 
society's maximization problem (Equation 18). 
(2) Private equilibrium. For each x, the outcome X(x) is an equi- 
l ibrium for individual agents. 
Without commitment,  the equilibrium allocation can diverge 
considerably from the commitment equilibrium. The reason why 
this is so can be traced back to the setting without a commitment 
technology. Individual agents first choose a vector x, and then gov- 
ernment chooses a policy, x. Given the individual and aggregate 
allocations, the problem faced by the government is to maximize 
Equation 18 with espect o x, giving rise to the first-order condition: 
n ~ 0 (20) 
~i=1 aT = 
Assume that similar to the outcome function X(.) for each vector 
x, the policy x defined by Equation 20 is unique and the policy rule 
7I(1 - 13)xi, 13x-] is differentiable. In the no-commitment equilibrium 
each individual agent takes the policy rule T(.) and the decisions 
of  other agents x_i as given and maximizes the following function 
with respect o x~. 
U[xi, T(x,(I - 13), 13x-)] (21) 
The first-order condit ion for each agent i is: 
OUOT 
O___U + O---x- ~x~ (1 - 13) = 0 (22) 
Ox, 
In this formula we let each agent take account of the effect of his 
action on the government's policy rule. Of course, when the number 
of  agents is large this effect will become small and in the limit zero. 
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Definition 2: A No-Commitment Equilibrium 
An equilibrium without commitment is a vector of private deci- 
sions x* and a policy rule T(.) that satisfy: 
(1) Private equilibrium. Given x* _ ~ and T(.), x* solves Equation 
21 for every i. 
(2) Maximization for society. For any x, the policy T(.) solves 
Equation 20. 
We are now able to compare the two equilibria with and without 
commitment. The equilibrium with commitment is completely 
characterized by Equations 17 and 19, yielding for all agents i: 
atf a~ atfl n 
or  + = o, ax, 
Without commitment, he equilibrium is characterized by Equa- 
tions 20 and 22 yielding: 
a~ a~ 
= 0 ,•  = 0  24) 
One of the propositions one can immediately derive from Condi- 
tions 23 and 24 is that if [I = 0 (i.e., the CR case) there is no 
time-inconsistency problem. This result depends on the fact that 
under those conditions the individual and the state have the same 
objective function. If, however, an economy is characterized by a 
mixture of systems or full PAYG coverage (i.e., 0 < 13 --- 1), the 
two equilibria diverge because the objective function of the state 
depends on aggregate per capita allocations, thereby causing a con- 
flict of interest among agents. With a commitment technology, 
the externality of the aggregate allocation is taken into account, 
whereas under conditions of free discretion the conflict among 
agents is allowed to develop freely. In general, the welfare of con- 
sumers under conditions of the discretionary policy is less than the 
welfare under conditions of a commitment technology. 
In conclusion, the general intuition behind the problem of time 
consistency revolves around the more down-to-earth notion of cred- 
ibility: Does one believe the government's intentions? The pitfall 
one encounters in numerous policy studies on aging is the absence 
of any consideration for the credibility of proposed solutions to 
the public financial problems tied to an aging population. 
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5. PITFALL IV: IMPLICIT INTERGENERATIONAL 
TRANSFERS 
One of the missing links in modeling aging economies is the 
development of the productivity of the individual employee over 
his or her lifetime. Knowledge about how labor is rewarded over 
its lifetime is quite abundant: In general, labor income over the 
working lifetime has an inverted U shape, t° However, the relation- 
ship between the individual's relative wage and his or her productiv- 
ity seems to be weak on a temporal basis (see Bishop, 1987). 
In general, wages seem to grow faster than productivity over 
the individual's life cycle. Firms finance this lifetime contract by 
equating the discounted sum of the individual's wage income with 
the discounted sum of the individual's productivity. The delayed- 
payment contract introduces a form of fixed costs into the employ- 
ment relationship. These fixed costs lead firms to hire primarily 
younger workers, who can start at the bottom of the firm's ladder. 
Empirical evidence by Hutchens (1986) shows that firms do employ 
older workers who are serving out the last years of their lifetime 
contract, but they tend not to hire new older workers. 
The number of explanations that have been put forward to ex- 
plain the phenomenon of delayed payment is quite diverse: The 
divergent wage-productivity nexus is used as an instrument (1) to 
discourage shirking and malfeasance (Lazear, 1979), (2) to facilitate 
firm-specific training, (3) to cushion the adverse ffects of variations 
in productivity, and (4) to avoid adverse selection, or (5) to facilitate 
a rising lifetime-consumption profile (Frank and I-Iutchens, 1993). 
Whatever the reason may be behind this wage-productivity con- 
struction, one immediate deduction seems relevant for discussing 
the economic onsequences of aging, namely: Within organiza- 
tions, intergenerational transfers are flowing from young workers 
to older workers. In other words, an implicit PAYG scheme is 
part and parcel of long-term job offers. This scheme is financed 
by paying younger workers less than their marginal productivity 
and older workers more than their worth in terms of productivity. 
The turning point in this schedule lies in the age bracket of 45 and 
50 years (see Eggink et al., 1993). Empirical evidence by Kotlikoff 
and Gokhale (1992) shows that productivity and wage income move 
in line for positions or functions that are tied to explicit productivity 
goals, like sales persons. Other types of personnel are more difficult 
l°See Murphy and Welch (1990). 
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to monitor and are paid in line with their expected lifetime produc- 
tivity. With respect o the future of aging populations there are 
three inherent weak points of this reward system, points that are 
at some instances already apparent in OECD countries (see OECD, 
1992). 
The first difficulty has to do with credibility of the sustainability 
of this implicit labor contract. The implicit contract ("the invisible 
handshake") stipulates that the older worker receives an income in 
excess of his marginal productivity; employers did not keep their 
promise and made the older workers leave the firm (OECD, 1992). 
By means of this breach of contract, the employer could improve 
the profitability of the firm by making the age structure of the firm 
younger so that the average pay is below the average productivity 
of the firm's employee. 
The second difficulty is connected with the indirect effect that 
the induced early retirement from the labor force has on the sus- 
tainability of PAYG public-pension schemes. With an eligible re- 
tirement age for a public pension that exceeds the early retirement 
age, the number of beneficiaries does not change, but the social 
security premium base does. Subsequently the premium will rise 
and, if conditions of dynamic efficiency prevail, reinforce the early 
retirement trend. In short, the implicit private PAYG scheme inside 
organizations and the public social security PAYG scheme will 
reinforce ach other when populations age. 
The third difficulty is connected to the second one because the 
majority of private pension schemes i benefit-defined; that is, pen- 
sion contracts are defined in terms of the benefits, and pension 
premiums are adjusted accordingly. Furthermore, the benefit is 
mostly stated as a replacement rate (usually 60% and 70°)  of the 
final pay one receives in working life. The "final pay" arrangement 
is, however, implicitly financed in a PAYG manner. Employees 
with a flat lifetime wage profile pay for the pensions of employees 
with a steep lifetime wage profile. Again, as Section 4 showed, 
every PAYG scheme is bound to be time-inconsistent and so is the 
"final pay" arrangement. 
6. SUMMARY 
Aging has a pervasive influence on economies. Not only the abso- 
lute size of population groups matters, but also the indirect effect 
of aging populations on relative prices of goods and production 
factors has to be taken into account if one wants to assess the 
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economic onsequences of aging. A number of causes have given 
rise to the phenomenon of aging, a fall in the fertility level and a 
rise in the average life expectancy being two of the most prominent 
causes. The predictability of those two variables has changed over 
time. The uncertainty surrounding the mortality rate has decreased 
over time, whereas the uncertainty of the fertility rate has not 
changed significantly. A thorough understanding of fertility re- 
mains one of the tasks of economists if they want to assess the 
economic onsequences of future demographic developments. 
In this paper I have provided for the reader a number of pitfalls 
one may encounter while analyzing or reading about future devel- 
opments in economic demography. The stability and constancy of 
population growth may provide economists the access to analyti- 
cally tractable models, but it may provide the reader a false picture 
of what lies ahead. Furthermore, statistical tests of the so-called 
theory of demographic transition do not reveal for the case of 
England and the Netherlands that this theory has some statistical 
significance: The death rate and birth rate are not cointegrated. A 
second pitfall is the constancy of relative-factor p ices and technol- 
ogy. Especially with the choice of a method of payment for social 
security programs, this pitfall may have considerable consequences. 
Economic history shows how important the uncertainty of relative- 
factor prices is for the macroeconomic analysis of social security 
finance. The time-inconsistency of PAYG schemes of social security 
schemes and implicit contracts of delayed payments constitute pit- 
falls number three and four, respectively. The PAYG schedule is 
not credible because it introduces a conflict of interest between the 
government and the citizen that will only coincide if the government 
employs the finance method of capital reserve. Another alternative 
is that the citizens act collectively and take into account he exter- 
nality in decision making that lies at the heart of the theory of 
time-inconsistency (see Rodrik, 1993). 
A major pitfall not discussed in this paper concerns the pitfall 
one encounters when examining the ethical side of aging societies, 
a pitfall that lies somewhat outside the scope of economic theory. 
The theory of public economies takes as a point of departure the 
two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. The first of these 
states that a competitive equilibrium isPareto-efficient. The second 
states that a centrally designed Pareto-efficient allocation can be 
achieved as a competitive equilibrium if prices are set appropriately 
and lump-sum incomes are allocated so that each individual can 
buy the consumption bundle given in the allocation at the prices 
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that will prevail. However, the possibility may be raised that even 
though one finds oneself in a situation that is called Pareto-efficient, 
this allocation may still be the worst of all possible worlds. One 
would like to go beyond the Pareto-efficiency riterion and consider 
different "states of the world" resulting from different economic 
policies. The Pareto principle eschews interpersonal comparisons 
of utility, and thus the principle cannot be used for comparing 
policies that generate gains for one group and losses to other groups. 
In evaluating the welfare consequences of aging or demographic 
change in general, one has to invoke a social welfare criterion to 
make the evaluation explicit. We have deleted a discussion on this 
pitfall because it lies outside the classical scope of economics and 
because a more-thorough discussion of this topic would involve 
an introductory exposition on ethics, an exposition that would be 
hampered by the limitations of space. 11 
The pitfalls mentioned above make the economic analysis of 
aging a challenging subject. The main lesson one should remember 
is to remain suspicious whenever one hears an economist or a poli- 
cymaker present policy measures or guidelines that "solve the aging 
problem." One should always try to make one's own evaluation of 
the economic implications of aging. Too much reliance on eco- 
nomic experts may induce a person to make exclamations similar 
in vigor to the outburst made by the U.S. President Warren G. 
Harding (1920-24) when he talked to his secretary after a hearing 
on matters of public finance: 
" John,  I can't make a damn thing out of  this tax problem. I listen to one 
side and they seem right, and then-God!  - I  talk to the other side, and they 
seem just as right. I know somewhere there is a book that will give me the 
truth, but hell, I couldn't read the book. I know somewhere there is an 
economist who knows the truth, but I don't  know where to find him and 
haven't he sense to know and trust him when I find him. God! what a job!"  
The economic policy analysis of aging is indeed a "hell of a job." 
However, I venture to state that the four pitfalls summed up in 
this paper may improve the job of the economist dealing with and 
analyzing the economic onsequences of aging. 
1~ Dasgupta (1988) discusses ome of the ethical problems of population economics. In 
a more down-to-earth manner Blanchet and Kessler (1991) show how the choice of social 
welfare parameters can drastically change policy conclusions with respect to pension finance 
in an aging society. 
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